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COMMENTS
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty-five years, the American juvenile justice sys-
tem has changed dramatically. Legislatures, executive agencies, and
courts across the United States have joined to transform this system
from a means of rehabilitating errant children to a means of punish-
ing juveniles for criminal acts. 1 While the goals of juvenile justice
may have changed, the methods employed by juvenile courts and
state agencies to achieve these goals do not completely reflect this
transformation.2 The latitude of discretion enjoyed by juvenile
courts and agencies in administering what used to be a process of
rehabilitation now threatens juveniles in an increasingly adversarial
process designed to exact retribution. As juvenile court adjudica-
tion assumes the nature and consequences of the adult criminal jus-
tice system, courts will find it more difficult to justify withholding
from juveniles the same procedural safeguards constitutionally
guaranteed to criminal defendants.
The shift toward punishment in juvenile justice is necessarily
inconsistent, as it has developed on a state-by-state basis. 3 Different
methods employed by the states to transform juvenile justice have
led to anomalous judicial interpretations concerning the constitu-
tionality of these various methods. Many courts seem caught be-
tween justifying the discretion of a previously benevolent juvenile
justice system, and extending the constitutionally guaranteed proce-
dural and substantive protections of criminal defendants to delin-
1 For recent examinations of this trend, see Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist,
Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETrncs & PUB. POL'Y 323 (1991); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991).
2 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment,
and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822 (1988).
3 See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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quents embroiled in an ever more hostile juvenile adjudication
process. For example, some courts still consider juvenile court ad-
judication distinct from criminal prosecution for the purpose of
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis. 4 Yet, courts
may also find the involuntary commitment of juvenile delinquents
analogous to criminal imprisonment when applying the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 5
The courts have interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment prohi-
bition of involuntary servitude with similar inconsistency in the area
ofjuvenilejustice. 6 The Thirteenth Amendment, widely recognized
as the Amendment that proscribed slavery, also prohibits involun-
tary servitude "except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted. ' 7 In the context ofjuvenile justice,
the Thirteenth Amendment raises the question of whether states
may compel juvenile delinquents to perform involuntary labor as
part of their juvenile court disposition.
Court-ordered community service and vocational training pro-
grams in juvenile detention centers are often incorporated into ju-
venile delinquent rehabilitation.8 In addition, some juvenile justice
statutes subject delinquents to compulsory labor expressly for the
purpose of punishment, not rehabilitation. 9 Under the terms of the
Thirteenth Amendment, however, involuntary servitude may exist
only "as a punishment for crime" of which a person has been "duly
convicted."' 0 Since juvenile court adjudication does not provide
4 See, e.g., In re S.C., 790 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (adjudication in juvenile
court without indictment does not violate due process); State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240
(Wash. 1987) (legislature may constitutionally deny juveniles the right to jury trial;
juveniles do not form a suspect class for equal protection purposes).
5 See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
6 Cf., Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332, 349 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (applying the
Thirteenth Amendment to strictly limit compulsory labor at juvenile detention centers);
In re S.C., 790 S.W.2d at 774-75 (applying the Thirteenth Amendment criminal punish-
ment exception to allow state imposition of compulsory labor on delinquents).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The entire amendment reads:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
8 See, e.g., Morales, 569 F. Supp. at 349; In re C.A.H., 578 N.E.2d 1321 (Il1. App. Ct.
1991).
9 See, e.g., State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 775 (Wash. 1979) (Rosellini, J., dissenting)
(citing the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 at WASH. REV. CODE 13.40.010 (1977)); In re
C.A.H., 578 N.E.2d at 1325 (citing Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 5-23, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, 805-23 (1989)).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
1992] 615
DONALD C. HANCOCK
the same due process protection given defendants in criminal prose-
cutions, a juvenile court's holding may not be a criminal conviction.
Because juvenile court findings are distinct from criminal convic-
tions,'I juvenile court dispositions which include involuntary servi-
tude may not be exempt under the Thirteenth Amendment.
As states have expanded their emphasis on punishment injuve-
nile justice, contradictions in Thirteenth Amendment interpretation
have become more prevalent. This article addresses the central
question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment's protection ex-
tends to juvenile delinquents. The purpose of this comment is not
to argue for or against the imposition of compulsory labor on juve-
nile delinquents. Rather, this comment will focus on the conditions
under which the Constitution permits compulsory labor in the con-
text of juvenile adjudication, disposition, and commitment.
The first section of this comment briefly addresses the scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment beyond slavery. Though not invoked as
often as other constitutional protections, the right to be free from
involuntary servitude has served to combat a wide range of social
conditions, from peonage which existed at the amendment's incep-
tion,' 2 to forced labor camps which have existed to the present.' 3
This section discusses the legislative and judicial developments in
the Thirteenth Amendment's scope which have defined the concept
of "involuntary servitude" as it is presently applied.
The next section of this comment addresses whether the ex-
plicit criminal punishment exception in the Thirteenth Amendment
applies to juvenile delinquents. Involuntary work programs for de-
fendants convicted in criminal court have long been held to be crim-
inal punishments and thus constitutional under the Thirteenth
Amendment.' 4 In several states, juveniles found delinquent' 5 are
I I See infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinctions
between juvenile and criminal adjudication.
12 See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Thirteenth
Amendment's application to peonage conditions.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1022 (1986); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981).
14 For a judicial history of the criminal punishment exception applied to convict la-
bor, see Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
15 Most juvenile justice statutes use a different terminology than that of criminal law.
Thus, criminals are prosecuted, and if found guilty of committing a crime are convicted
and sentenced. Juveniles, on the other hand, may be adjudicated, found delinquent for
having committed an offense, and are given a disposition rather than a sentence. See
infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text. In this comment, I will use the term "juve-
nile" or "minor" to describe someone subject to the jurisdiction ofjuvenile court. The
term 'juvenile delinquent" will denote a juvenile who has been found by that court to
have committed an offense.
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also subject to dispositions whose purpose, at least in part, is to
punish them for the violation of criminal statutes.' 6 Juvenile courts
and juvenile detention centers may require delinquents to perform
involuntary labor as part of their court disposition and commit-
ment.1 7 By analogy, some courts have reasoned that the imposition
of involuntary servitude on juveniles adjudged delinquent falls
within the criminal punishment exception to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.18 This comment argues that such reasoning must fail because
it ignores the constitutional distinctions between juvenile court ad-
judication and criminal court prosecution and sentencing.
Section three of this comment discusses the implicit exceptions
to the Thirteenth Amendment which may justify the imposition of
compulsory labor on juvenile delinquents. These exceptions, rec-
ognized at common law, include the state's imposition of servitude
as a civic duty, as well as a parent or guardian's imposition of com-
pulsory labor on children in his custody.' 9 Part A of this section
addresses the civic duty exception, which exempts the government
from the Thirteenth Amendment when it requires citizens to per-
form labor for the public welfare.20 Some courts have suggested
that juvenile court dispositions requiring the performance of labor
to maintain juvenile detention facilities may be constitutional under
this civic duty exception. 21
Part B of section three evaluates whether the courts may apply
the Thirteenth Amendment's implied exception for parental guardi-
ans to the state in its adjudication, disposition, and commitment of
juvenile delinquents. At common law, courts have exempted par-
ents-and anyone acting as parents-from the prohibition of invol-
untary servitude as it applies to children in their custody. 22 Under
the principle of parens patriae, the state assumes the role of a juvenile
delinquent's parents because both the parents and the juvenile him-
self are presumed incapable of providing an environment which
16 See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of punitive-based ju-
venile court dispositions.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., MJ.W. v. State, 210 S.E.2d 842, 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); In re Erickson,
604 P.2d 513, 513-14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). See also infra section II for a discussion of
the criminal punishment exception applied to juvenile delinquents.
19 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916).
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332, 349 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
22 See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (exempting from the
Thirteenth Amendment "the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their mi-
nor children or wards").
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promotes the delinquent's best interests. 23 Courts have argued that
the state, in its role as surrogate parent disciplining a juvenile delin-
quent, qualifies for the same implicit exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment that applies to the parents and guardians of other
juveniles. 24 As juvenile justice adopts the punitive nature of the
criminal justice system, however, the government may act less as a
surrogate parent and more as an adversary. 25 Some jurists have
questioned whether, under any juvenile justice system, the govern-
ment ever assumes the role of a surrogate parent acting in the
child's best interest.26
Part four of this comment reviews the judiciary's attempts to
develop guidelines for the imposition of involuntary servitude on
juvenile delinquents. While some courts find compulsory labor in-
compatible with a delinquent's rehabilitation, 27 other courts find
that required work programs may provide useful therapy.28 Still
other courts find that the Constitution permits states to use compul-
sory labor as a form of punishment, which may serve a role in the
reformation of delinquents.29 Consensus in this area has yet to be
reached.
The conclusion of this comment will briefly explain how the
Thirteenth Amendment forces a more conscious development of
the juvenile justice system. The imposition of involuntary servitude
as criminal punishment will require the extension of all criminal due
process safeguards to the juvenile court. Alternatively, society may
choose to justify the imposition of compulsory labor on juvenile de-
linquents under the implicit exceptions to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. The legal prerequisites to these exceptions would force
governments to restructure the juvenile justice system, focusing
solely on the rehabilitative treatment of delinquents in the state's
custody. Either choice represents a policy decision with a profound
impact on the way our society views its children.
23 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (explaining the premise of
parens patriae).
24 See, e.g., In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 339 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
25 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (noting the trend for juvenile
justice programs to more closely resemble the practices and philosophy of criminal
justice).
26 Schall, 467 U.S. at 289-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27 See, e.g., King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
28 See, e.g., M.J.W. v. State, 210 S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
29 See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 988 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (Ist Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
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I. THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT OF INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
On first impression, one might question how the Thirteenth
Amendment applies at all in the context of juvenile justice. The
Thirteenth Amendment, after all, most frequently provokes
thoughts of slavery and the Civil War. Yet, the nineteenth century
did not mark the end of the Thirteenth Amendment's relevance in
our society because the amendment also prohibits involuntary servi-
tude, which has persisted in various forms to this day. For example,
in the last ten years the United States Department ofJustice has re-
ceived more than one hundred complaints alleging involuntary ser-
vitude arising in such contexts as agricultural work, domestic work,
religious cult activities, and prostitution.30 In the last twenty-five
years, courts have found violations of the Thirteenth Amendment
resulting from the imposition of involuntary servitude on migrant
laborers,31 household servants, 32 and patients at state mental insti-
tutions.33 Such a variety of applications suggests that the prohibi-
tion of involuntary servitude has acquired a broad scope. This
section of the comment discusses how Congress and the courts have
developed the meaning of involuntary servitude and whether this
condition occurs in the adjudication, disposition, and commitment
of juvenile delinquents.
Congress has long attempted to define the scope of involuntary
servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. So extreme
was the concept of prohibiting all forms of involuntary servitude
that radical Republican legislators supporting the amendment, as
well as conservatives opposed to it, feared that its scope would be
too broad.3 4 At least one Congressman attempted to introduce a
more limited version of the amendment which exempted involun-
tary servitude "arising from the relations of parent and child, master
and apprentice, guardian and ward," but this attempt failed.35 Per-
haps by not giving involuntary servitude a specific definition, legisla-
tors reached a compromise that allowed for the amendment's
30 James Henry Haag, Comment, Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth Century Concept In
Search of a Twentieth Century Definition, 19 PAC. L.J. 873, 873 n.2 (1988).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1022 (1986).
32 United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.,
Singman v. United States, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
33 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
34 Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
437, 454, 478 (1989).
35 Id. at 456 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 528 (1865) (remarks of
Rep. Brown of Wisconsin)).
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passage but also guaranteed contention over its proper application
in the years to come.
The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment did not expect that
a mere declaration would bring an end to either slavery or involun-
tary servitude, so they explicitly provided for the enactment of sup-
plemental legislation to enforce the amendment's substantive
provisions. 36 Congress passed supplemental enforcement legisla-
tion in response to specific activities it identified as manifestations of
involuntary servitude violating the Thirteenth Amendment.3 7 For
example, in 1867, Congress passed the original Peonage Act in an
attempt to abolish peonage systems used primarily in the western
territories to secure Mexican, Indian, and Chinese "coolie" labor.38
Congress also enacted the Padrone Statute of 1874,39 aimed at
preventing the sale of immigrant Italian boys into involuntary servi-
tude by parents willing to send a son to America in exchange for
that child's labor.40
Early in this century, Congress revised supplemental legislation
to extend Thirteenth Amendment protection to people of all races,
emphasizing the prohibition of the condition of involuntary servi-
tude instead of the protection of a particular group of people. 4 t Yet
some Thirteenth Amendment proponents believed that supplemen-
tal legislation should extend protection from involuntary servitude
on the basis of a person's vulnerability to oppression.42 These Con-
gressmen intended to "enable the law to reach those who come here
without being a party to the disposition of their services or the con-
trol of their rights whether they be children of irresponsible years
and conditions or whether they be people who, because of their en-
vironment or conditions of their lives cannot protect
themselves. . .."43
While supplemental legislation has been applied in a wide
range of contexts, Congress enacted these enforcement statutes
only in response to specific situations that it found to violate the
36 "Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
37 Haag, supra note 30, at 877-84.
38 Id. at 880. Railroad barons used much of this labor to extend their empires across
the Western Frontier.
39 Act ofJune 23, 1874, ch. 464, § 1, 18 Stat. 251 (1874).
40 Haag, supra note 30, at 881. See, e.g., United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
41 Haag, supra note 30, at 882. In 1909, Congress revised the Slave Trade Act of
March 2, 1807, ch. 22, § 6, 2 Stat. 427 (1807), which attempted to curb the further
importation of blacks for use as slaves in the United States. Id.




Thirteenth Amendment. 44 Congress' role in developing the Thir-
teenth Amendment's scope through enforcement legislation repre-
sents an ex post reaction to societal conditions, rather than a
prospective vision defining the right against involuntary servitude.45
By reacting to specific conditions, Congress has failed to anticipate
new contexts of involuntary servitude where the principles of Thir-
teenth Amendment protection may be relevant. This reactive pos-
ture has resulted in a noticeable absence of supplemental
enforcement legislation addressing compulsory labor in the context
of juvenile court adjudication, disposition, and commitment.
While supplemental legislation focused attention on what Con-
gress considered to be the most prevalent violations of the Thir-
teenth Amendment,46 the courts by necessity assumed a prominent
role in the development of the Thirteenth Amendment's scope.
The Supreme Court, in effect, required the judiciary to consider
Thirteenth Amendment claims not contemplated by enforcement
statutes when it held that the amendment is "self-executing without
any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any ex-
isting state of circumstances." 47 Initially, the judiciary construed
the limits of the Thirteenth Amendment by determining whether in-
volutary servitude existed, "irrespective of the manner or authority
by which it is created."'48 More recently, however, courts have
shifted their analysis from defining what constitutes involuntary ser-
vitude to identifying the unconstitutional means to compel labor.49
As this comment discusses, contemporary Thirteenth Amendment
precedent suggests that compulsory labor arising from juvenile
court adjudication, disposition, and commitment may fall within the
definition of involuntary servitude.
Since the beginning of this century, courts have been reluctant
to define the Thirteenth Amendment by limiting its application to a
specific class of potential victims especially vulnerable to slavery or
involuntary servitude. 50 Instead, the Thirteenth Amendment repre-
sents "the denunciation of a condition, and not a declaration in
favor of a particular people." 5 1 By focusing their analyses on the
44 See id. at 877-83.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
48 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (prohibiting the use
or threat of physical or legal coercion to compel servitude).
50 See, e.g., Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 403 (1968).
51 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 16-17.
1992]
DONALD C. HANCOCK
condition of involuntary servitude, rather than on the characteriza-
tion of a limited class of potential victims, the courts were able to
extend Thirteenth Amendment protection to situations involving
"coercion and oppression, in varying circumstances" beyond the
paradigm of black slavery. 52 This approach left the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment very broad, but it did not provide a positive
test for determining the constitutional limits of involuntary
servitude.
In the past thirty years, courts have struggled to interpret the
scope of the prohibition on involuntary servitude. "While the gen-
eral spirit of the phrase 'involuntary servitude' is easily compre-
hended, the exact range of conditions it prohibits is harder to
define." 53 Rather than attempting to define the conditions which
constitute involuntary servitude, contemporary judicial interpreta-
tion has focused on the means of coercion used to compel labor in
determining the scope of Thirteenth Amendment protection. For
example, in United States v. Shackney,54 Judge Friendly found that in-
voluntary servitude could result only from labor compelled by the
use or threat of physical force or by the legal threat of imprison-
ment.55 While this standard appears to set the objective parameters
of involuntary servitude, the Shackney court's analysis explicitly per-
mits judicial consideration of the victim's subjective belief in the
threat of the coercion at issue.56
Other circuits have suggested that a court's test for involuntary
servitude should give even more weight to the victim's perception of
coercion. 57 For example, the Ninth Circuit accorded perceived or
psychological coercion the same legal status as physical and legal
coercion in its analysis of involuntary servitude.58 Yet the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the Shackney test, limited to proof of physical or legal
coercion, failed to recognize both the historically mandated breadth
of Thirteenth Amendment protection, as well as the need for an
evolving standard of involuntary servitude. 59 Just as "[t]oday's in-
voluntary servitor is not always black," the court reasoned, so too
52 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1911) (applying the Thirteenth Amendment
to invalidate a state law which subjected debtors to imprisonment and involuntary servi-
tude as restitution for breach of a labor contract where advance payment was made).
53 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
54 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964).
55 The threat of criminal imprisonment may also be referred to as legal coercion.
56 Shackney, 333 F.2d at 486.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying the
Shackney court's test), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
58 United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Singman v.
United States, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
59 Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1451-52.
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"the methods of subjugating people's wills have changed from bla-
tant slavery to more subtle, if equally effective, forms of coercion." 60
The Ninth Circuit's test for involuntary servitude required only a
finding that the will of the victim had been subjugated, by whatever
means, to the extent that the victim believed he had no alternative
but to perform the labor.6 1
More recently, the Sixth Circuit limited the psychological coer-
cion test so that it applied only to those people inherently vulnera-
ble to coercion: minors, foreign-speaking immigrants, and the
mentally incompetent.6 2 The Sixth Circuit found this group analo-
gous to the class of persons lacking the capacity to contract, so the
court allowed psychological coercion to serve as proof of involun-
tary servitude in this context.6 3 In this manner, the Sixth Circuit
attempted to harmonize the Shackney court's criteria of physical and
legal coercion with the Ninth Circuit's more subjective psychologi-
cal test.64
While the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's ruling, it
rejected as too broad a test which relied upon the victim's state of
mind to define the limits of involuntary servitude.6 5 The Court ac-
knowledged that "the vulnerabilities of the victims are relevant" in
determining the existence of involuntary servitude, but it held that
the victim's subjective belief could be used only to establish the
credibility of the physical and legal coercion prohibited in
Shackney.66
Although we can be sure that Congress intended [the Thirteenth
Amendment] to prohibit" 'slavelike' conditions of servitude," we have
no indication that Congress thought that conditions maintained by
means other than by the use or threatened use of physical or legal
coercion were "slavelike." Whether other conditions are so intolera-
ble that they, too, should be deemed involuntary is a value judgment
that we think is best left for Congress.6 7
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1452-53. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the Shackney test as being too
narrow and instead adopted its own test from a concurrence in that case. See United
States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concurring).
62 United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), af'd,
487 U.S. 931 (1988).
63 l at 1193.
64 Id. at 1192.
65 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988), aff'g 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.
1987) (en banc).
66 Id. at 952. The Court suggested that the existence of a legal or physical threat
would be easier to prove if the victim was especially vulnerable, because such a victim
could be more easily persuaded than a normal adult that the threat was credible enough
to compel labor. Id. at 948.
67 Id. at 951 (quotingJustice Brennan's concurrence at 961).
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Instead of defining involuntary servitude by example, the
Supreme Court construed the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit
labor compelled by the "use or threat of physical restraint or injury,
or the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process." 68
The Court restricted the standard of involuntary servitude because
it recognized that a definition which included labor compelled by
psychological coercion "would appear to criminalize a broad range
of day-to-day activity." 69 Activities which would be prohibited
under the psychological coercion standard might include a parent's
use of emotional influence over his offspring (both minor and adult
children), a political leader's use of intellectual influence over cam-
paign volunteers, and a religious leader's use of spiritual influence
over a congregation. 70
Ironically, the Supreme Court's Kozminski test appears to render
unconstitutional another activity which society has accepted as rou-
tine, viz., the imposition of compulsory labor on juvenile delin-
quents by the juvenile justice system. By definition, juvenile court
orders which require juvenile delinquents to perform compulsory
labor constitute "the use or threat of coercion through law or the
legal process." 7' In fact, juvenile court orders requiring the per-
formance of community service 72 or participation in work programs
administered by a juvenile detention center 73 are commonplace in
the juvenile justice system. For example, an Illinois appellate court
affirmed a juvenile court judge's order compelling a juvenile delin-
quent to perform public service work or to obtain private employ-
ment in order to make restitution to victims. 74 In addition, the
appellate court approved the imposition of additional periods of
confinement for failure to comply with the juvenile court's orders. 75
Furthermore, juvenile detention center staff members systemat-
ically employ "the use or threat of physical restraint" or the "use or
threat of coercion through law" in their efforts to compel participa-
tion in detention center work programs. For example, under some
juvenile justice administrative policies, a delinquent who refuses to
68 Id. at 952.
69 Id. at 949.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 952. See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., MJ.W. v. State, 210 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
73 See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Androscoggin County, 611 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D. Me. 1985).
74 In re C.A.H., 578 N.E.2d 1321, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
75 Id. The Supreme Court has previously found the threat of imprisonment for fail-
ing to make restitution a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 244-45 (1911) (invalidating a statute which subjected debtors to criminal
imprisonment for failure to make restitution).
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participate in compulsory detention center work programs may be
confined to a "solitary" cell or subjected to a hearing before ajuve-
nile court judge, who may increase the delinquent's period of com-
mitment to the detention center as a penalty for refusing to work.76
II. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
EXCEPTION
As the above examples illustrate, the juvenile justice system's
imposition of compulsory labor on delinquents meets the Kozminski
court's definition of involuntary servitude. Consequently, this im-
position of involuntary servitude must be found unconstitutional
unless it qualifies as an exception to the Thirteenth Amendment.
One possible basis for the exemption of juvenile delinquents from
the Thirteenth Amendment's protection may be the amendment's
explicit criminal punishment exception, which prohibits involuntary
servitude "except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted." 77 Applying this exception to juvenile
delinquents requires the characterization of delinquent disposition
and confinement as a form of punishment for criminal behavior.
Furthermore, application of the criminal punishment exception also
depends upon whether juvenile court adjudication meets the "duly
convicted" qualification in the Thirteenth Amendment.
A. THE EXPLICIT CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT PREREQUISITE AND JUVENILE
COURT DISPOSITIONS
In the United States, a separate system ofjuvenile justice arose
from the "belief that juveniles were different from adults and
needed to be protected, nurtured, and treated, rather than held
completely responsible and punished for their wrongdoing."78
Courts recognized the legislative intent to promote rehabilitation,
not retribution, through juvenile justice statutes:
Hence the state legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile de-
linquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so
blameworthy that punishment is required to deter him or others. Co-
ercive measures, where employed, are considered neither retribution
nor punishment. Supervision or confinement is aimed at rehabilita-
tion ... 79
For example, juvenile delinquents usually do not go to prison, but
76 See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 79-80 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Morgan v.
Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1153 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
77 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
78 Forst & Blomquist, supra note 1, at 324.
79 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 552 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
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they may be sent to training schools or camps to receive education
and treatment.8 0
In distinguishing juvenile justice from criminal justice, someju-
rists have concentrated intensely on the statutory language carried
over from the past. Yet, the emphasis on differentiating juvenile de-
linquents from criminal convicts has prevented some jurists from
sufficiently acknowledging the shifting focus of juvenile justice.8 '
Despite more than a century of treating delinquency with rehabilita-
tive programs, the juvenile justice system has failed to meet the pub-
lic's expectations.8 2 No matter what the reasons for this failure may
be,8 3 society has grown discontent with the treatment-oriented ad-
ministration ofjuvenile justice. The disappointment with this reha-
bilitative approach has prompted legislation that instead attempts to
punish juvenile offenders and hold them criminally responsible for
their behavior.8 4 For example, Washington state's legislature
passed the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, the goals of which, in part,
are to:
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal
behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and
criminal history of the juvenile offender...(j) Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders
shall receive punishment, treatment, or both ... 85
Other states also recognize punishment explicitly as part of the
raison detre of the juvenile justice system. For example, the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act authorizes juvenile court judges to impose pun-
ishments on delinquents, including participation in community ser-
vice programs and labor in private employment for the provision of
restitution to victims. 8 6 By its incorporation of the Illinois criminal
justice code, this Act also empowers juvenile court judges to impose
80 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 257 n.4 (1984) (describing New York's
Family Court Act as providing for the rehabilitative disposition ofjuvenile delinquents).
81 For more thorough analysis of this shift, see Forst & Blomquist, supra note 1; Feld,
supra note 1.
82 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, at 7-9 (1967), cited in McK-
e/ver, 403 U.S. at 544 (noting the report as a "devastating commentary upon the system's
failures as a whole").
83 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544 (arguing that a lack of funding, a lack of concern and
poor administration prevented the proper implementation of rehabilitative programs).
84 See Feld, supra note 1, at 692 (noting that punishment has displaced treatment as
the premise for confining juvenile delinquents); and see generally id. at 708-18.
85 State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 775 (Wash. 1979) (Rosellini, J., dissenting) (citing
the juvenile Justice Act of 1977, WASH. REv. CODE § 13.40.010 (1977)).
86 See, e.g., In re C.A.H., 578 N.E.2d 1321, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (citing Ill.Juv. Ct.
Act § 5-23, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, 805-23 (1989)).
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additional periods of confinement as a punishment for failing to
comply with the court's orders. 87
Due to the increased emphasis on punishment, juvenile adjudi-
cation may result in the imposition of determinate periods of con-
finement as well as compulsory labor.88 Yet, some courts still deny
that such juvenile court dispositions necessarily constitute a form of
punishment.89 For example, one litigant challenged a state's impo-
sition of forced labor resulting from a juvenile court disposition.90
He argued in part that the delinquency proceedings and subsequent
disposition amounted to criminal prosecution in violation of Texas
juvenile justice statutes, and that, in any event, the criminal punish-
ment exception could not apply to juvenile delinquents.9 1 Rejecting
his first claim, the court relied on its literal interpretation of the stat-
ute regulating the juvenile court disposition at issue:
[A]ppellant ignores the Family Code pronouncement that "[a]n order
of adjudication.., under this title is not a conviction of a crime, and
does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a convic-
tion. . . ." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.13(a) (1986) Although appellant
labels his adjudication a "criminal prosecution," his categorization
does not necessarily make it so. 9 2
This same judge, however, found that the "quasi-criminal" nature
of the juvenile justice system casts the appellant's disposition as a
form of punishment within the scope of the criminal punishment
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment.9 3
Some courts, however, have probed beyond a strictly textual in-
terpretation of statutes to determine a delinquent's constitutional
rights, finding that "[1]ittle, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt
simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either 'civil' or
'criminal'." 9 4 Such courts have applied a broader construction of
legislative intent both to distinguish and to analogize juvenile court
and criminal court proceedings.9 5 As a federal district judge ob-
served, "Declaring that juveniles confined at [youth centers] are
prisoners or civilly committed persons should not control the out-
87 Id. at 1325 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-5-6(h) (1989)).
88 See, e.g., In re Erickson, 604 P.2d 513, 513-14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (citing the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, WASH. REv. CODE § 13.40.010 (1977), which updated the
state's juvenile justice system).
89 See, e.g., State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145, 1148-50 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); infra note
127 and accompanying text.
90 In re S.C., 790 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
91 Id. at 773.
92 Id. at 773-74.
93 Id. at 774-75.
94 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
95 See infra notes 120-44 and accompanying text.
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come of this [Thirteenth Amendment] constitutional claim. Rather,
the justification for confining juveniles should determine the appro-
priateness of work assignments for [juvenile detention center]
residents." 96
Courts have relied on the increasing punitive emphasis in juve-
nile justice as grounds for applying the Thirteenth Amendment's
criminal punishment exception. As early as 1974, a state court
found that "the quasi-criminal aspects of juvenile law" justified the
imposition of involuntary servitude on juvenile delinquents under
the amendment's criminal punishment exception. 97 In rejecting a
claim that juvenile court-ordered community service violated the
Thirteenth Amendment, a Washington court cited the punitive
goals listed in that state's juvenile justice statute.98 "Given these
similarities with the adult criminal justice system, we hold that the
juvenile disposition order did constitute 'punishment for crime' suf-
ficient to fall within the constitutional exception to involuntary
servitude." 99
As a result of the conflict between the revised punitive goals
and the rehabilitative aims which remain, the courts disagree about
the intent of juvenile justice statutes and about what effect this in-
tent has on a juvenile delinquent's constitutional rights.100 For ex-
ample, in determining which constitutional standards to apply to
juvenile confinement, some federal courts found delinquents
equivalent to criminal convicts, 101 while others distinguished
juveniles due to the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice stat-
utes. 10 2 Most courts would agree that "[t]he status of the detainees
determines the appropriate standard for evaluating the conditions
of confinement."' 0 3 Yet, the judicial conflict over the roles played
by punishment and rehabilitation in juvenile justice suggests that
96 Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
97 M.J.W. v. State, 210 S.E.2d 842, 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
98 In re Erickson, 604 P.2d 513, 513-14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (citing the Juvenile
Justice Act of 1977, WASH. REv. CODE § 13.40.010 (1977)). See also supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
99 In re Erickson, 604 P.2d at 514.
100 See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text which portray the inconsistent inter-
pretations of one state's juvenile justice statutes.
101 See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (applying the Eighth Amendment to protect delinquents at a juvenile detention
center from being beaten by guards).
102 See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
application of both the Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" standard
and the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard to juvenile detention centers).
103 Id. at 1432.
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the courts have failed to recognize the Thirteenth Amendment pro-
tection owed to minors adjudicated in juvenile court.
B. THE "DULY CONVICTED" REQUIREMENT AND JUVENILE
ADJUDICATION
While the criminal punishment exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment allows the imposition of involuntary servitude, the
amendment stipulates that the punishment must result from a
"crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."10 4 Con-
sequently, courts must find that juvenile adjudication meets this
"duly convicted" requirement of the Thirteenth Amendment in or-
der to apply the exception to juvenile delinquents. Some courts, by
analogizing the language and intent of juvenile justice statutes to
the criminal justice code, have found that juvenile adjudication
meets this requirement. 10 5 Alternatively, courts have compared the
consequences ofjuvenile adjudications versus criminal prosecutions
to determine whether juvenile court proceedings meet the "duly
convicted" requirement. 106 Through both modes of analysis, courts
have recognized that the more punitive aspects of delinquency pro-
ceedings justify the extension of certain criminal due process safe-
guards to the accused in juvenile court.' 0 7 Still, courts have denied
juveniles some of the most fundamental rights afforded criminal de-
fendants, 08 on the grounds that society has refused to abandon
completely the rehabilitative premise of the juvenile justice
system.'0 9
In their attempts to differentiate the administration of juvenile
and criminal justice, the courts have contrasted the flexible process
of juvenile adjudication from the constitutionally mandated proce-
104 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
105 See, e.g., In re Erickson, 604 P.2d 513, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)(describing legis-
lative intent to punish delinquents for acts which would be crimes if committed by
adults); In re S.C., 790 S.W.2d 766, 774-75 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); see also infra notes 124-
30 and accompanying text.
106 See, e.g., In re S.C., 790 S.W.2d at 775 (juveniles receive "many of the same due
process rights that are afforded to adult criminal defendants," so punishment imposed
on juveniles for committing an offense does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment).
107 See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266 (1984) (authorizing a more lenient
standard of justification for pretrial detention of juvenile delinquents); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (refusing to confer on juveniles the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial for fear that it would transform juvenile adjudication
from an "informal protective proceeding" into a "fully adversarial process").
109 See, e.g., Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982), for the proposition that the state has a parens patriae interest in promoting the
best interests of delinquents).
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dures of criminal prosecution. °10 By acknowledging that juvenile
adjudication and disposition are not equivalent to criminal prosecu-
tion and conviction, the judiciary has confirmed that juvenile delin-
quents are accorded a different constitutional status than that of a
criminal defendant who is prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced."'I
As the Thirteenth Amendment's stated exception applies only to a
person who has been "duly convicted" of a crime, proof that juve-
nile court procedures do not meet the constitutional due process
requirements for criminal prosecution and conviction precludes ap-
plication of the criminal punishment exception to juvenile
delinquents.
Courts have found the conditions of the "duly convicted" re-
quirement to be met "[w]here a person is duly tried, convicted, sen-
tenced and imprisoned for crime. ... 112 Challenges against the
imposition of compulsory labor have failed where the plaintiff, a
prison inmate, contested an out-of-prison work release program, 31 3
as well as where a prisoner contested forced labor while his convic-
tion was on appeal. 14 In contrast, the Due Process Clause prohibits
any punishment of pre-trial detainees. 1 5 Both trial and appellate
courts have acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibi-
tion of involuntary servitude extends to persons detained for rea-
sons not related to criminal conviction. 116 For example, the
criminal punishment exception does not apply to a person commit-
ted to a state institution for treatment of a narcotics addiction." 7
The Supreme Court also recognizes that the states may impose
I10 See, e.g., id. (balancing the need for "fundamental fairness" in procedures with the
juvenile court's unique need for "flexibility" and "informality" to promote the child's
welfare).
I11 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (distinguishing juvenile court adjudication from crim-
inal prosecution in order to justify denying a minor accused in juvenile court his Sixth
Amendment rights).
112 Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
1"3 Murray v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 760 (1991).
114 Foster v. Daley, 1991 WL 140125 at *1, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10022 at *2 (N.D.
Ill. July 18, 1991). The Fifth Circuit recently found that the criminal punishment excep-
tion applies only to those convicts who are sentenced to hard labor, while other convicts
retain their Thirteenth Amendment rights. Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th
Cir. 1990). This position, however, was stated in dicta not dispositive of the holding and
sits squarely against all other precedent. See, e.g., Draper, 315 F.2d at 197 ("There is no
federally protected right of a state prisoner not to work while imprisoned after convic-
tion, even though that conviction is being appealed.").
115 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
116 See, e.g., Stone v. City of Paducah, 86 S.W. 531, 533 (Ky. 1905) (refusing the state
permission to compel labor from a mentally disabled man confined in a county jail for
the public's protection); Exparte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (E.D. Ky. 1936).
117 Exparte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. at 1009.
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criminal sanctions, such as compulsory labor, only as a result of a
criminal conviction, "" and not merely as a consequence of commit-
ment to a state institution." 9
To determine whether juvenile court adjudication meets the
"duly convicted" requirement of the criminal punishment excep-
tion, some courts have relied upon statutory analysis. 120 Juvenile
justice statutes often employ terminology distinct from the language
of criminal law.12 ' For example, juvenile offenders are not "prose-
cuted" at "trial" and "convicted" upon being found "guilty" of
"crimes."' 122 Instead, juvenile court judges preside over adjudica-
tions where they determine whether ajuvenile is delinquent for hav-
ing committed an offense. 123
State courts, however, have employed their interpretations of
juvenile justice statutes both to contrast and to analogize delin-
quency proceedings and criminal prosecution. 124 For example, the
Supreme Court of Washington characterized the state's juvenile jus-
tice statutes as both punitive and rehabilitative, and on that basis it
distinguished juvenile court adjudication from the unequivocally
punitive mechanism of criminal prosecution. 125 Incongruously, a
Washington appellate court cited the same characterization of the
statute's quasi-punitive elements to justify the application of the
criminal punishment exception against juvenile delinquents. 126
Three years later, the state supreme court expediently applied its
previous characterization to justify longer, presumably more reha-
bilitative, periods of confinement for juveniles than for criminal de-
fendants convicted for committing the identical acts.' 27 Yet, less
118 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (1975) (dis-
tinguishing the bases of commitment between a patient confined to a mental institution
and a criminal convict held in prison).
119 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (stating that persons in-
voluntarily committed, who are not convicted criminals, "may not be punished at all").
120 See, e.g., In re S.C., 790 S.W.2d 766, 773-74 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
121 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971) (White, J., concurring)
(noting the word choice used in statutes to distinguish juvenile and criminal
proceedings).
122 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 257 n.4 (1984) (description of New York's Fam-
ily Court Act providing for the adjudication of alleged juvenile offenders).
123 Id.
124 See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
125 State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 772-73 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (refusing to extend
to juvenile delinquents the right to trial by jury, in order to preserve the rehabilitative
aspects ofjuvenile justice).
126 In re Erickson, 604 P.2d 513, 513-14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
127 State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145, 1148-50 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) (arguing that the
intent of the juvenile justice system was to respond to the special needs of each delin-
quent, providing rehabilitation or punishment according the individual and the context
1992]
DONALD C. HANCOCK
than eighteen months later the same court acknowledged the juve-
nile justice system's evolution from a "parens patriae scheme to one
more akin to adult criminal proceedings," and it consequently up-
held the use of criminal defense pleadings in "juvenile proceedings
that are criminal in nature."' 128 Through their interpretation of the
intent of juvenile justice statutes as "somewhere midway between
the poles of rehabilitation and retribution," 129 the lower courts have
subjected juvenile delinquents to criminal punishment without giv-
ing them the benefit of all the due process safeguards constitution-
ally guaranteed to criminal defendants.' 30
The Supreme Court, through its failure to reconcile the con-
fliciting punitive and rehabilitative aspects of juvenile adjudication,
has also produced such constitutionally anomalous results. The
Court initially responded to increasingly punitive juvenile justice,
statutes by extending many due process safeguards to delinquency
proceedings.' 3 ' The Court reasoned that "civil labels and good in-
tentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due pro-
cess safeguards in juvenile courts, for '[a] proceeding where the
issue is whether the child will be found "delinquent" and subjected
to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution.' "1132 Recognizing a need to balance the rehabil-
itative goals of juvenile justice with the punitive consequences of
juvenile adjudication and disposition, the Court extended to juve-
nile delinquents such procedural safeguards as the reasonable
doubt standard of proof,133 the right to counsel' 3 4 and cross-exami-
nation of witnesses, 3 5 as well as the privilege against self-
incrimination. ' 3 6
Despite its acknowledgement of the increasingly punitive na-
ture of juvenile justice, the Court has refused to extend to juveniles
all the constitutional safeguards afforded criminal defendants be-
of his offense). The court explicitly rejected Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
arguments relating to the practices of juvenile court disposition. Id.
128 State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 560 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (permitting the use of the
"infancy defense," which posits a lower standard of accountability based on the of-
fender's lesser mental and moral development).
129 State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 244 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
130 See, e.g., id. at 242 (refusing to afford juveniles the right to trial by jury in delin-
quency proceedings).
131 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); infra
notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
132 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36).
133 Id. at 364.
134 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37.
135 Id. at 57.
136 Id. at 55.
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cause it fears that this would put the criminal imprimatur on juvenile
delinquency proceedings.13 7 For example, the Court withheld from
delinquents the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, implying that
juries would be less forgiving of delinquents and would somehow
undermine the treatment orientation of juvenile adjudication. 138
The Court also held that more stringent guidelines concerning the
detention ofjuveniles pending adjudication furthered the rehabilita-
tive goals of juvenile justice.13 9
The Supreme Court has thus applied a balancing approach to
justify increased procedural safeguards protecting juvenile delin-
quents from some of the punitive consequences of juvenile justice,
without extending to delinquents all of the constitutional safeguards
accorded criminal defendants. 140 This balancing approach, how-
ever, offers little guidance to the lower courts in their interpretation
of a juvenile delinquent's constitutional rights. Rather than relying
on the well-developed standards of criminal due process, the
Supreme Court has determined which constitutional rights apply to
juvenile delinquents on the basis of "fundamental fairness" and the
Court's desire to sustain the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice
long abandoned by many states.' 4 1
In the abstract, then, a state may not impose criminal depriva-
tions of liberty on juveniles absent a criminal conviction reached
through due process. 142 In practice, however, courts have not
reached a consensus on which constitutional rights apply to the ad-
judication and disposition of juvenile delinquents. For example,
courts have extended to delinquents the Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel and confrontation of witnesses, while at the same time
witholding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Just as incon-
gruous is the decision to give alleged delinquents Fourteenth
Amendment protection from the pre-adjudicatory punishment,1 43
while the same juveniles possess fewer rights than criminals with re-
137 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
138 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971). Ironically, conservatives on
the Court feared that any depiction ofjuvenile court adjudication as a criminal process
would harm the still viable goal of rehabilitation, while more liberal jurists urged the
bench to extend constitutional protections to juveniles subjected to more punitive juve-
nile justice laws. Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139 Schall, 467 U.S. at 264-68.
140 Id. at 257 n.4.
141 Id. at 263.
142 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring). See
also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (stating that persons involuntarily
committed who are not convicted criminals "may not be punished at all"); Milonas v.
Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 n.10 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
143 Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
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spect to pre-trial detention. 144
While thejudiciary examines the statutory language, intent, and
practices of juvenile adjudication, it ignores the constitutional sig-
nificance of withholding from juvenile delinquents a fundamental
due process safeguard. "Any institutional rules that amount to pun-
ishment of those involuntarily confined prior to an adjudication of
guilt of criminal wrongdoing are violative of the due process clause
per se."' 145 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury
trial in all criminal prosecutions. 46 The Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of involuntary servitude "except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed."' 147 At a minimum, then, the judiciary must afford juveniles
the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings before juvenile
court adjudication can be considered criminal prosecution for pur-
poses of constitutional law.
Whether our society should treat juvenile offenders like their
adult counterparts properly concerns a legislative debate over the
competing normative values of rehabilitation and punishment. But
what fundamental rights our judicial system must recognize for
criminal defendants, and non-criminal detainees as well, is man-
dated by the Constitution. Until juvenile delinquents receive the
same due process safeguards provided in criminal prosecutions, ju-
venile court adjudication and disposition does not meet the "duly
convicted" requirement of the Thirteenth Amendment's criminal
punishment exception.
III. IMPLICIT EXCEPTIONS TO THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
In addition to the Thirteenth Amendment's explicit exception
for criminal punishment, the judiciary has recognized a number of
contexts in which the prohibition of involuntary servitude does not
apply. The Supreme Court acknowledged that certain traditional
servitude relationships are beyond the scope of constitutional
interference:
It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to introduce
any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which
have always been treated as exceptional, such as military and naval en-
listments, or to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the cus-
tody of their minor children or wards.... To say that persons engaged
in a public service are not within the amendment is to admit that there
144 Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
145 Milonas, 691 F.2d at 942 n.10. See also supra note 142.
146 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
[Vol. 83
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
are exceptions to its general language, and the further question is at
once presented, where shall the line be drawn? We know of no better
answer to make than to say that services which have from time imme-
morial been treated as exceptional shall not be regarded as within its
purview.1 48
As the Court failed to provide criteria for determining which
services were implicitly exempt, exceptions to the prohibition of in-
voluntary solitude seemed limitless. Rather than establish guide-
lines, some courts merely relied on the "recognized exceptional
status" of such persons as "sailors ... soldiers ... minors, appren-
tices, idiots, and lunatics" to justify their exception from Thirteenth
Amendment protection. 149
Over time, however, courts have articulated the rationale by
which the state may constitutionally impose involuntary servitude.
For example, the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to compul-
sory labor in the performance of civic duties. 150 As Congress meant
to prohibit only those forms of compulsory labor that restricted lib-
erty, the Supreme Court reasoned, the Thirteenth Amendment
''was not intended to interdict those duties which individuals owe to
the state," which promotes its citizens' liberty.1 5 1 Furthermore,
courts have held that the Thirteenth Amendment may not apply to
compulsory labor imposed upon persons legally held in protective
custody.1 5 2 In its role as parens patriae, the state may determine that
compulsory labor serves as a form of rehabilitation which promotes
the welfare of persons in state custody. 153
Courts have suggested that both of these Thirteenth Amend-
ment exceptions, civic duty and parens patriae, may permit the state
to impose compulsory labor on juvenile delinquents in its cus-
tody.15 4 Yet both of these exceptions also imply conditions which
must be met by the state before it becomes exempt from the prohi-
148 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (denying Thirteenth Amendment
protection to seamen on the basis of their voluntarily assent to the duty of servitude
recognized in admiralty).
149 Exparte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (E.D. Ky. 1936).
150 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916) (holding that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment did not prohibit a state from requiring able-bodied citizens to provide some mini-
mal assistance in the maintenance and construction of public roads).
151 Id. at 333.
152 See, e.g., Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1966) (allowing states to
impose compulsory labor with a therapeutic purpose on mental institution patients);
Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332, 349 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (setting guidelines for the
imposition ofjuvenile detention center work programs).
153 See, e.g.,Jobson, 355 F.2d at 134 (acknowledging the state's authority to impose
mental institution work programs in the interest of patient therapy and rehabilitation).
154 See, e.g., Morales, 569 F. Supp. at 349 (permitting the state to impose compulsory
chores at a juvenile detention center to help maintain a public facility); MJ.W. v. State,
19921 635
DONALD C. HANCOCK
bition of involuntary servitude. In the context of civic duty, the state
must show that the imposition of compulsory labor serves a compel-
ling state interest and is a burden shared by other citizens.155 As a
prerequisite to the parens patriae exception, the state must show that
compulsory labor promotes the rehabilitation of persons committed
to state custody. 156 Consequently, whether the civic duty and parens
patriae exceptions apply to juvenile delinquents depends upon the
extent to which the state's imposition of involuntary servitude satis-
fies these conditions.
A. THE CIVIC DUTY EXCEPTION
The Court has recognized the civic duty exception to uphold
compulsory participation in public works projects,15 7 the military
draft and service,' 58 as well as alternative service for conscientious
objectors.' 59 These cases of compulsory labor arise from a citizen's
social compact with the state, and they fulfill compelling interests in
the protection and development of society. More recently, the civic
duty exception has been applied to state programs which impose
compulsory labor on people to help defray the costs of state institu-
tions from which they specifically benefit. For example, one federal
court waived Thirteenth Amendment protection and approved
mandatory labor for high school students, based on the state's inter-
est in fiscal savings.' 60
Yet, courts disagree whether the civic duty exception justifies
the imposition of compulsory labor on juvenile delinquents.16' A
federal district court in Texas found that a state may require
juveniles to participate in work programs that assist in the mainte-
210 S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding a juvenile court's imposition of
community service work as rehabilitation in the delinquent's best interest).
155 Bobilin v. Bd. of Educ., Hawaii, 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975).
156 See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (prohibiting a
juvenile detention center from imposing compulsory labor which served no therapeutic
purpose).
157 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916) (confirming the constitutionality of
required participation in state public road projects).
158 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
159 Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1944) (noting that the Thirteenth
Amendment "was never intended to limit the war powers of government or its right to
exact by law public service from all to meet the public need").
160 Bobilin, 403 F. Supp. at 1095 (finding the threshold of public benefit met by the
cost savings from the use of mandatory student work in state high school cafeterias).
161 Cf., Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332, 349 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (allowing limited
use of compulsory labor to maintain the facilties at a juvenile detention center); Morgan
v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1153 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (prohibiting the assignment of




nance of detention center facilities.162 In contrast, a Mississippi fed-
eral district court held that a state could not require delinquents to
perform any compulsory labor, including maintenance work, except
if that labor was part of an accredited vocational training pro-
gram.' 63 The court reasoned that because the state's only constitu-
tional interest in confining juveniles was their treatment and
rehabilitation, the state could not justify work programs that did not
relate to those purposes. 64
B. THE PARENS PATRIAE EXCEPTION
Courts have disagreed, too, whether the parens patriae exception
justifies involuntary servitude in the rehabilitation of juvenile delin-
quents.' 65 Some courts recognize that the state as parens patriae may
impose compulsory labor based on its " 'legitimate authority for the
control and education of children, since a child may be subjected to
restraints that may be necessary for his proper education and disci-
pline that could not be applied to adults.' "166
At least one influential jurist, Justice Marshall, has criticized the
parens patriae analogy between a state's confinement of a juvenile de-
linquent and the supervision provided in that child's home:
[The] characterization of preventive detention as merely a transfer of
custody from a parent or guardian to the State is difficult to take seri-
ously. Surely there is a qualitative difference between imprisonment
and the condition of being subject to the supervision and control of an
adult who has one's best interests at heart.' 67
While courts have recognized the state's parens patriae interest as
exempt from the Thirteenth Amendment, they have sharply dis-
agreed over the extent to which that interest justifies the imposition
of compulsory labor on juvenile delinquents. Some courts find that
the state has a duty under parens patriae to provide juveniles with
rehabilitative treatment, 6 8 which would strictly limit the amount
162 Morales, 569 F. Supp. at 349.
163 Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1153.
164 Id. at 1135 (the nature of involuntary commitment must "bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed") (quotingJackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
165 Cf King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); M.J.W. v. State, 210 S.E.2d
842, 843-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
166 In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 339 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (quoting 16 C.J.S.
Con. Law § 203 (5)). See also H.F.H., Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute for Reformatory
Purposes Deprives Parent of Custody or Control of Child, 60 A.L.R. 1342 (1929).
167 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168 See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
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and types of compulsory labor justified as being in the child's best
interest.
Analogizing the confinement of a juvenile delinquents to the
involuntary commitment of mental patients, one court held that due
process limited a state's juvenile justice practices to programs which
were reasonably related to a delinquent's treatment and rehabilita-
tion.169 Another court similarly held that "[w]hen a state assumes
the place of ajuvenile's parents, it assumes as well the parental du-
ties, and its treatment ofjuveniles should, so far as can be reason-
ably required, be what proper parental care would provide."' 170
This standard affords juvenile delinquents the right to "individual-
ized care and treatment" that meets the minimum standards ap-
proved by the trial court.17 1
In contrast, many courts reject the notion that parens patriae con-
finement of juvenile delinquents restricts the state's use of compul-
sory labor to rehabilitation programs. 172 Instead, the state may
decide what types of work programs are in the delinquent's best in-
terest, limited only by the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. 73 Another court suggests that national
standards, provided by experts in juvenile corrections, serve as pre-
sumptively valid guidelines which limit a state's detention prac-
tices. 174 Such guidelines, if they exist, likely discuss the extent to
which states may impose compulsory labor on juvenile delinquents.
Yet, no court has cited national standards adopted by either the fed-
eral or state judiciary. This lack of consensus is hardly surprising
because juvenile justice administrators exercise "a substitute paren-
tal control for which there can be no particularized criteria."' 175 If it
is human nature to criticize how parents raise their children, then
people are even quicker to denounce the effectiveness of surrogates.
IV. THE FORMULATION OF GUIDELINES
While there is no consensus on the extent to which parens patriae
169 Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1153 (citingJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
See supra note 164.
170 Nelson, 491 F.2d at 360.
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 974-75 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); Morales v.
Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998-99 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 565 F.2d 1215 (1977).
173 Morales, 562 F.2d at 998-99.
174 Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
175 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1984) (quoting People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, 350 N.E.2d 906, 910 (N.Y. 1976)).
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justifies compulsory labor, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that for people involuntarily committed by the state, "the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed."1 76 Assuming, as
the Court does, that juvenile justice programs retain some rehabili-
tative purpose,17 7 then juvenile delinquents in detention centers
must be treated differently than criminal convicts in prison. "When
a person is institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the state-
... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist, although
even then a State necessarily has considerable discretion in deter-
mining the nature and scope of its responsibilities."' 178
Federal courts have managed to escape the formulation of con-
sistent guidelines for the imposition of involuntary servitude on ju-
venile delinquents, despite a canon of constitutional review which
requires the delineation of objective standards.' 79 Federal courts
may hesitate to exercise their equitable powers to enact guidelines
because many juvenile court judges retain jurisdiction to amend dis-
positions sua sponte.' 80 Furthermore, federal courts may refrain
from intervening where the juvenile delinquent has not exhausted
avenues for relief provided by the state.' 8 ' Yet, federal courts rec-
ognize their obligation to review the consequences ofjuvenile court
dispositions, especially where state officials countenance the prac-
tices challenged on constitutional grounds. 8 2 In reviewing the
state-sanctioned imposition of involuntary servitude on juvenile de-
linquents, federal courts must establish guidelines which protect the
juveniles' constitutional rights without infringing on the states' right
to adopt and administer their own juvenile justice policies. 83
Achieving this balance is an exacting task, because it is as easy to
176 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1150 (S.D.
Miss. 1977).
177 Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (1984) (affirming the state's parens patriae interest in the
reform ofjuvenile delinquents).
178 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
179 Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (courts must determine the constitutionality of punish-
ment through the use of objective factors to the maximum possible extent)). See also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977) (reserving decision on the constitu-
tional treatment in juvenile detention facilities).
180 Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 972 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 974 (1984).
181 Id.
182 Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 149, 153 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
183 Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23




overstep the bounds of federal jurisdiction as it is difficult to formu-
late rules which have no constitutional loopholes. For example, one
circuit court noted the overzealousness of a trial judge in setting
regulations to be implemented by a defendant juvenile detention
center: "[N]othing we can find in the due process clause ... or in
Supreme Court decisions authorizes a federal district judge to es-
tablish candle power at desk level of reading lamps, proscribe pink
pajamas, or order the superintendent of the institution to maintain
seasonal temperatures appropriate for resort hotels." 18 4
On the other hand, policies which broadly outlaw punishment
and promote rehabilitation may not go far enough to prevent the
imposition of involuntary servitude under the parens patriae ration-
ale. One juvenile detention center ran a "vocational program" in
which half the students were merely assigned to work crews and
compelled to perform manual labor, without even a pretense of
training or instruction.18 5 The chief administrator at another juve-
nile detention facility imposed "useless," "strenuous," and "de-
grading" field labor on delinquents, punishing those who would not
participate in the work with beatings and tear gas assaults. 186 This
administrator attempted to justify the imposition of "such unpro-
ductive and humiliating labor" by explaining that "anything that
helps the staff control the boys is therapeutic." 187
In response to the unconstitutional policies administered at this
detention center, the district court drafted rules for the Texas Youth
Council (TYC), which the court believed would put an end to Thir-
teenth Amendment violations:
Students in TYC facilities shall not be required to perform work of any
kind (other than academic school work) unless (1) the work is reason-
ably related to the student's housekeeping or personal hygienic needs
and is equitably shared by the other students in that program or facil-
ity, (2) the work is part of an approved vocationally oriented program
for the student, (3) the work is in furtherance of the maintenance of
the facility and is in lieu of restitution for property damage committed
by the student or is routine clean-up which is equitably shared by all
the students, (4) the student volunteered for the work assignment, or
(5)the student is being compensated for the work assignment. 188
After ten years of litigation, as well as careful consideration by
184 Id.
185 Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1153 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
186 Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 79-80 (E.D. Tex. 1974). The delinquents
were forced to swing heavy pickaxes and pull grass by hand for hours at a stretch with-
out a break. Id.
187 Id. at 81.
188 Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332, 349 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
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the district court, perhaps only the first two of these five rules would
prevent detention centers from administering compulsory labor
programs in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 189 The third
rule does not place limits on maintenance work, 190 and it also
wrongly assumes that the Thirteenth Amendment makes an excep-
tion for compelled labor to make restitution. 19 1 The volunteerism
envisioned in the fourth rule is not an appropriate proviso in the
context of a juvenile detention facility, where physical and legal co-
ercion may persist to the extent that staff "requests" for volunteers
may be interpreted by the juvenile inmates as orders. Finally, the
fifth rule conditions acceptable work assignments on payment, but
compensation does not convert involuntary servitude into voluntary
labor. 192
Some courts have rejected the notion that parens patriae could
ever serve as a justification for the imposition of compulsory labor
on juvenile delinquents.193 Rather than equate all forms of involun-
tary servitude with punishment, other courts have characterized ju-
venile court dispositions of compulsory labor as part of the
rehabilitation process.194 For example, one court upheld a juvenile
court's imposition of community service work under the parens pa-
triae exception, by noting the therapeutic effect such a disposition
was meant to have:
As the trial judge stated: "This is specific action designed to foster in
him an understanding that he's got some responsibilities and what it
takes to create something as opposed to going around destroying
things." (T. 28). It is constructive rather than punitive. It comes
within the mandate that juvenile court judges are to make such dispo-
sition of a delinquent child as is "best suited to his treatment, rehabili-
tation, and welfare." Code Ann. § 24A-2302.195
The reviewing court, however, felt it necessary to justify the
community service work on other grounds as well, and paradoxically
claimed that the disposition fell under the criminal punishment ex-
ception to the Thirteenth Amendment. 196 Another court which up-
held the parens patriae imposition of community service similarly
189 The second rule could arguably be circumvented by sham vocational programs,
unless "approved programs" meant curriculum and instruction accredited by the state
public school system. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
193 King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352,
360 (7th Cir. 1974).
194 See, e.g., MJ.W. v. State, 210 S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 844.
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diluted its opinion by noting that the record did not provide evi-
dence of court-ordered labor and that community service may have
required only attendance at an educational seminar.19 7 Finally, an
even more extreme view holds that "[d]isciplinary measures and
punishment are an integral part of the rehabilitative process" for
juvenile delinquents.198
While the imposition of compulsory labor on juvenile delin-
quents may not always be therapeutic, it may not always be punitive
either. Constitutional interpretation of compulsory labor in the
treatment of delinquents is extremely difficult, because "Federal
Courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, and ... matters such as
the wholesale reform of the juvenile justice system are not within its
competence or expertise."' 199 Perhaps the best the federal bench
can do to limit institutional abuses of power is to restrict the discipli-
nary practices used at juvenile detention centers, 200 and to require
administrators to provide accredited programs of rehabilitation and
professional assessment to ensure the progress of each delin-
quent.20 1 As one court noted, the imposition of compulsory work
programs as both rehabilitative and disciplinary treatment may not
be mutually exclusive. "[W]e conclude that the truth lies some-
where between Plaintiffs' contentions to the effect that conditions at
the juvenile facilities resemble the Black Hole of Calcutta and De-
fendants' version that they approximate a Hollywood version of Fa-
ther Flanagan's Boys' Town." 20 2
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty-five years, juvenile justice systems have
become progressively more retributive in their goals as well as in
their methods. One manifestation of the growing punitive nature of
juvenile justice is the states' imposition of compulsory labor onjuve-
nile delinquents. Compulsory labor programs may fulfill several
goals in juvenile justice simultaneously: the acknowledgement of so-
ciety's desire for offender accountability, the provision of restitution
in the form of payment to victims or the performance of related
community service, and the instillment of values and moral respon-
197 In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 339 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
198 Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 988 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 714 F.2d 1172 (lst Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
199 Id. at 978.
200 See, e.g., Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 943 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1069 (1983) (limiting juvenile detention center disciplinary practices to those required
for the maintenance of order and security).
201 See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
202 Santana, 533 F. Supp. at 969.
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sibility in delinquents through the discipline of work. Whatever its
purpose, the imposition of compulsory labor on delinquents
through present juvenile justice systems does not comport with the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude.
Supporters of punitive juvenile justice advocate compulsory la-
bor for delinquents under the Thirteenth Amendment's criminal
punishment exception. Juveniles, like criminal defendants, must be
"duly convicted" of a crime before this constitutional exception will
apply. While some states provide juveniles with many procedural
safeguards, no juvenile justice system affords alleged delinquents
the same due process guaranteed to criminal defendants by the con-
stitution. Until juvenile justice systems can pass constitutional mus-
ter, the imposition of compulsory labor on delinquents cannot be
justified by the Thirteenth Amendment's criminal punishment
exception.
Alternatively, some courts suggest that the government may
justify compulsory labor for delinquents as an exercise of the state's
power under parens patriae. Yet, reformers who advocate compul-
sory labor as therapeutic treatment in the juvenile's best interest
must rebut the Thirteenth Amendment's presumption that involun-
tary servitude is oppressive and punitive rather than rehabilitative.
To meet this burden of proof, juvenile justice systems would have to
provide individualized treatment programs. Such an undertaking
would require tremendous political and financial commitments from
our society, as well as the government's perseverance to gain the
long-term benefits of such rehabilitative programs. Yet these obsta-
cles pale in comparison to the social costs of crime, unemployment,
and illiteracy, which are the adult products ofjuvenile delinquency.
Under today's juvenile justice system, "there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 203 By
helping to alleviate this problem, the Thirteenth Amendment may
serve yet again as a catalyst for social reform.
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203 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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